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Abstract—We present an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study node cooperation behavior in wireless ad hoc networks.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been used to study the conditions governing the growth of cooperation behavior in biological
and social networks. We propose a model of node cooperation behavior in dynamic wireless networks such as vehicular networks.
Our work is motivated by the fact that, similar to existing EGT studies, node behavior in dynamic wireless networks is characterized
by decision making that only depends on the immediate neighborhood. We adapt our model to study cooperation behavior in the
context of information dissemination in wireless networks. We obtain conditions that determine whether a network evolves to a state of
complete cooperation from all nodes. Finally, we use our model to study the evolution of cooperation behavior and its impact on content
downloading in vehicular networks, taking into consideration realistic network conditions.
Index Terms—Wireless Networks, Ad Hoc Networks, Vehicular Networks, Cooperative Networking, Evolutionary Games.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Packet delivery in multi-hop wireless networks depends
critically on the interaction between individual nodes.
As successful transmission of a packet from a source to
a destination requires forwarding by intermediate nodes,
it is necessary to understand how node cooperation
can be engendered and sustained. This becomes more
crucial when considering future deployments of multi-
hop wireless networks such as vehicular networks which
are characterized by high scalability and dynamicity.
In this paper, we are interested in understanding the
evolution of node cooperation behavior in a wireless
network. We are particularly interested in studying how
node cooperation behavior evolves in dynamic scenarios
such as that of a vehicular networks. Our primary mo-
tivation is that node decision making in such contexts
needs to be spontaneous and myopic in nature, since the
available information is limited to locally available infor-
mation. Our approach is inspired from existing studies
in Evolutionary Game Theory which study evolution of
node behavior in similar contexts.
Our motivations stem from the fact that the current
trend in game theoretical approach in wireless networks
mostly focus on optimization issues based on technical
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criteria [1] (e.g. minimization of the energy spending,
and traffic maximization). However, in practice the coop-
erative behavior might not be only driven by algorithmic
incentives but also driven by user’s behaviors that might
just decline to participate in the information relaying
process as in peer to peer networks where some users
(”Free-Riders”), choose not to engage for themselves in
the forwarding process. Beyond this decision based on
the local behavior of nodes, there is an intricate relation-
ship between the ratio of cooperator in the network and
the information dissemination process characterized by
a phase transition (e.g. too few forwarders will lead to a
very restricted diffusion). To face this issue the network
as a whole needs to maintain the sufficient conditions
for diffusion to take place. This collective behavior need
to be addressed as well as the local behavior of a node
that decides or not to participate to the forwarding
process regardless if the decision process is taken base
on technical, or user centric concern or a mix of both.
The Evolutionary Game Theory seems perfectly suited
to address these issues: first because the outcome of the
game is derived from the local decision and secondly
by the social pressure could be expressed as the ratio of
people sharing the same behavior.
1.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory [2], [3] is a general theoretical
framework that can be used to study many biologi-
cal problems including but not limited to host-parasite
interactions [4], eco-systems [5], animal behavior [6],
social evolution, and human language [7]. Evolutionary
games arise to study population dynamic where the
fitness of individuals is not constant, but depends on
the relative abundance of strategies in the population
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2pool. Originally intended for studying cooperative in-
teractions in biological systems, EGT studies how the
strategy adopted by a node evolves as a result of its in-
teractions with others. The framework have recently in-
cluded feature like stochastic dynamics, finite population
size, and structured populations. Indeed, the evolution
of network characteristics as a function of interactions
between individual nodes has become the primary focus
of recent research on Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)
[8], [9] (cf. Fig. 1 for a example of EGT with a structured
population). A salient property to notice is EGT doesn’t
suppose that all of the players make rational choices
(i.e. a player in a EGT does not necessary adapt his
strategy as function of his opponents’ strategies, or don’t
act only toward their self-interest) as oppose to classical
game theory. As result in EGT we are more interested
in studying the condition for achieving an evolutionary
stable state (ESS) which is akin of Nash equilibrium [2].
The survival of a strategy in a network depends on the
benefits achievable by it in comparison to other strate-
gies. It is a well known result from EGT that in unstruc-
tured populations (random encounter between nodes),
natural selection favors defection over cooperation, as
opposed with model with a structured population (i.e.
on graphs) where cooperation is favored over defection
[8]–[11]. Indeed, in structured population model where
the interactions are constrained either by spatial or social
relationships the emergence of cooperative behavior is
favored when the altruistic acts exceed the connectivity
of a node, thereby making the cooperation on graph a
valuable option in case of mild connectivity. This fact
is especially true in the case of scale free graph [12].
Another important aspect is the problem of how the
survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the
mobility of nodes in the graph, in [13] authors show that
cooperation can survive given that both the temptation
to defect and the velocity at which agents move are not
too high. In [14] authors provide new insight on a similar
problem but in the case of Public Good Games instead
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
1.2 Motivation for Using Evolutionary Game Theory
to Study Node Cooperation Behavior
Traditional game theory based approaches to improve
packet delivery in wireless networks typically involve
design of utility functions that depend on multiple pa-
rameters. In such scenarios, arriving at an optimal con-
figuration either involves sufficient amount of available
information or learning over time.
Existing research on improving cooperation among
wireless nodes seeks to do so either through incentive
and punishment mechanisms or by design of detailed
utility functions. While extensive literature exists on the
subject of game theory in wireless multi-hop networks,
we draw attention to a few that are similar in motivation
to ours. Ng et al. proposed a architecture in [15] in which
monitor nodes impose punishments on selfish nodes to
induce cooperation. Focusing on primarily on unicast
packet routing in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),
Chen et al. [16] propose an incentive mechanism based
on coalitional game theory which rewards nodes that
take part in packet forwarding. Concentrating also on
VANETs, Schwartz et al. studied utility function based
approaches for improving data dissemination in [17].
The authors analyze utility functions which incorporate
message characteristics such as priority, distance to its
location and age along with mobility information of the
vehicle such as route information. A data selection al-
gorithm based on similar utility functions was proposed
in [18] with a view to achieving fair distribution of data
among vehicular nodes. Shrestha et al. consider separate
utility functions for Road Side Units (RSUs) and On
Board Units (OBUs) and propose an algorithm based
on Nash Bargaining Solution to achieve large scale data
dissemination in VANETs [19].
Contrasted to existing literature, we are interested in
studying network scenarios where nodes do not pos-
sess enough information to construct detailed utility
functions. Our objective here is to focus on how node
behavior evolves in scenarios in which, not only nodes
have limited information about the network, but their
interaction with partners nodes also change frequently.
In such a scenario, it seems intuitive for nodes to make
myopic decisions based on instantaneously available in-
formation. In the absence of global network information,
it is plausible for nodes to choose strategies which may
only seem to be the best, based on the limited informa-
tion available, but are not optimal from the standpoint
of the entire network. The attractiveness of EGT for
vehicular networks stems from its ability to adapt to var-
ious network parameters that change over time. Further,
there is a greater need for cooperation among nodes in
a vehicular network for applications requiring dissem-
ination of information to all nodes. In such scenarios,
while node cooperation is vital to ensuring maximum
coverage for the disseminated information, the rational
choice for any node is to receive such information but not
to cooperate by forwarding it, since there are no gains
to be received by doing so. Compared to classical game
theory, an interesting aspect of EGT is that it provides a
way to understand how node strategies can thrive even
when such behavior is not rational in terms of received
payoffs.
A topic of particular interest for the study of coop-
eration is the Public Goods Game (PGG), in which the
contributions from cooperating nodes are distributed
equally among all nodes in the group. The rational
behavior for an individual is to defect and not contribute
anything to the public good, resulting in the tragedy
of commons [20]. However, despite defection being the
Nash Equilibrium, it is observed that cooperation can not
only survive in a wide range of situations but even dom-
inate at times. The conditions for cooperation in PGGs
has seen extensive research focus [21]–[23]. However,
to our knowledge, PGGs have not been studied in the
3context of various wireless ad hoc network deployments
such as VANETs. PGGs are suitable for the study of node
behavior in wireless networks due to the prevalence
of group interactions. Further, as with PGGs, nodes in
wireless networks are presented with a natural incentive
to defect.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we seek to understand node cooperation
behavior in wireless networks using evolutionary game
theory. We first propose a public goods games (PGG)
framework for wireless networks. The key feature of
our proposed model is to adapt existing designs of
PGGs to the unique constraints of a wireless network.
Specifically, our model takes into consideration two
important limitations of wireless networks. Firstly, we
consider that nodes only posses information from the
immediate neighborhood. Secondly, contrasted to exist-
ing definitions of PGGs, benefits of cooperation are also
realized only from one hop neighbors. Conversely, we
also make a crucial observation that wireless multi-hop
networks have an intrinsic ability to boost cooperation
due to implicit sharing of information as a result of
wireless broadcast advantage [24]. Subsequently, we use
our model to study node cooperation behavior for the
problem of information dissemination. Finally, we focus
on a realistic problem setup of content downloading in
vehicular networks and study how node cooperation
behavior evolves in such a scenario.
1.4 Related Work
Sharing a similar motivation as ours, existing research
on wireless networks has seen some focus on algorithm
design and analysis based on evolutionary game theory.
In [25], Tembine et al. used evolutionary dynamics to
analyze node behavior over time in the context of two
problems, namely channel access in slotted ALOHA
systems and decentralized power control. Evolutionary
coalition games were used to study the problem of
network formation in [26] and [27] while dynamic rout-
ing games were studied in [28]. In their work in [29],
Cheng et al. studied the evolution of misbehavior among
secondary users in a cognitive radio network.
A key aspect of our work which distinguishes it
from existing research is the fact that we study node
cooperation behavior in the context of information dis-
semination in wireless networks. Our approach aims to
identify the mutual impact that the evolution of node
cooperation and the information dissemination process
have on each other. As with the problem of information
dissemination in vehicular networks considered here,
there exist other scenarios in which free-riding is the only
rational strategy for nodes to follow. Indeed, existing
research has explored the use of evolutionary game the-
oretic techniques to study node cooperation in scenarios
such as peer-to-peer file sharing [30]–[32]. However, the
distinguishing feature of our work is that our model of
node behavior is particularly suited for wireless network
scenarios since we take into consideration aspects like
node interactions limited to immediate neighborhood
and the intrinsic ability of the wireless medium to boost
cooperation.
2 PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
2.1 Overview
Public Goods Games (PGG) is a model of interaction for
groups of individuals, all of which are interested in reap-
ing benefits from a shared public good. In a PGG, the
benefit available to a particular group is divided equally
among all its members. Cooperating members contribute
a certain cost into the public pool. The total contributions
are then multiplied by a synergy factor r (discussed
next) and divided equally among each individual in
the group, irrespective of whether it is a cooperator or
a defector. The net payoff of a cooperator, therefore,
is the benefit received from the PGG minus the cost
contributed. A node i in a network takes part in multiple
PGGs determined by the size of its neighborhood. For
each PGG centered on each neighbor of node i, the
benefit received by i is determined by the number of
cooperators in each such group.
An important component of the PGG is the factor r,
termed as the synergy factor, used to account for the
synergistic effects of cooperation. Synergistic effects of
cooperation refer to the fact that the benefits received as
a result of cooperation can be greater than the sum of
the contributed costs. The synergy factor r is a measure
of the benefits obtained due to cooperation. Increased
synergistic effects imply greater benefits received by
individual nodes compared to the costs incurred and
is, therefore, more likely to induce cooperative behavior
[33], [34].
Depending on the amount contributed by each coop-
erator, two variants of PGGs have been studied in the
literature. In the simplest case, a cooperator contributes
a fixed cost c to each PGG it is involved with. For a group
with N participants and nC cooperators, the payoff of a
cooperator and a defector are, respectively,
piC = r
nC
N
c− c
piD = r
nC
N
c.
Each node accumulates the payoffs obtained from all its
neighboring PGGs.
A second variant of PGG considers the scenario in
which a cooperator does not contribute a fixed amount
c for each PGG they are involved with. Instead, a coop-
erator i reserves a total amount c to all the PGGs it is
involved with. Let ki denote the degree of node i, i.e. the
number of immediate neighbors of i. Since, for a node
i with degree ki, there are a total of (ki + 1) PGGs, the
contribution made to a single PGG is cki+1 . Subsequently,
the cooperator and defector payoffs for a node i from a
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Fig. 1. Example of Evolutionary Game in a structured population. The rules of the game. Each individual occupies the
vertex of a graph and derives a payoff according to the game rules and from interactions with adjacent individuals. In
a next step the selected node change it behavior according to the outcome of the previous game played.
PGG centered at node j are obtained as,
piC =
r
kj + 1
∑
x∈Nj
c
kx + 1
sx − c
ki + 1
piD =
r
kj + 1
∑
x∈Nj
c
kx + 1
sx
where sx = 1 if x is a cooperator and 0 otherwise, while
Nj denotes the set of neighbors of j.
Based on the payoffs obtained, nodes update their
strategy at each time instant by comparing their payoff
values to a randomly chosen neighbor. If the chosen
neighbor j of a node i has a higher payoff, i adopts
j’s strategy with a probability given by the following
function:
Pij =
1
1 + exp[(pii − pij)/κ] (1)
where κ denotes the intensity of selection and is usually
set to 1.
2.2 Motivation
Our choice of PGGs as the evolutionary game to for-
mulate the above mentioned information dissemination
problem is motivated by direct analogies that exist be-
tween the two. As with any peer-to-peer system, one of
the primary challenges of the information dissemination
problem lies in the tendency of nodes to free-ride over
the contributions of others. As individual nodes are only
interested in receiving information, they can choose to
not act as forwarding nodes. However, while free-riding
is the more profitable behavior for individual nodes, the
actual algorithm performance crucially depends on the
forwarding behavior of nodes. A network consisting of
only free-riders soon results in no packets being received
by any node. Such behavior directly correlates to node
behavior in a public goods game, in which defection
promises higher payoffs than cooperation and therefore,
is the more profitable strategy. However, a population
of all defectors soon dies off with zero payoffs as no
contributions are made. Despite the clear benefits of de-
fection, however, cooperation is seen to thrive and even
dominate in a wide range of scenarios. Existing studies
on evolutionary games, thus, offer a way to identify
application scenarios in vehicular networks in which
cooperation behavior among nodes can be expected to
thrive and those in which it does not.
3 A PUBLIC GOODS FRAMEWORK FOR
MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS
As outlined earlier, a public goods game presents an
attractive method of accurately modeling node cooper-
ation behavior for the information dissemination prob-
lem. However, the nature of packet transmissions in a
multi-hop wireless network imposes restrictions which
limit the amount of payoff available to a node. As a
result, the classical definition of PGG cannot be used
directly. In order to understand how node cooperation
behavior in a multi-hop wireless network evolves over
time, we formulate a public goods framework taking
into consideration the constraints imposed by a wireless
network in determining node payoffs. Subsequently, we
use simulation results to identify the impact of increase
in the synergy factor and node mobility on the level
of cooperation in a network. The results presented in
this section and the next focus on the node cooperation
behavior in the steady state. The steady state refers to the
long term behavior to which the nodes in the network
converge to.
3.1 Adapting PGG to Multi-hop Wireless Networks
Our approach aims to define the payoff received by a
node in a single time slot. We use the second variant of
PGG defined earlier as a baseline since it incorporates
diversified contributions from each cooperator. Such a
design is suited especially for broadcast protocols in
wireless networks since a single transmission from a
node is sufficient to reach all its neighbors. The contribu-
tion of a cooperating node, thus, does not grow with the
number of neighbors, but stays constant. Considering the
transmission of a packet within a single time slot as the
unit cost, this is the maximum cost a cooperator can con-
tribute in a time slot. However, the likelihood of a node
transmitting in a slot is determined by the contention
5in its neighborhood. The contribution of a node, thus,
depends on its degree. We express the contribution of a
cooperator i as cki+1 , where ki is the degree of i and c
is the constant cost per contribution, taken equal to 1 in
this paper since we consider the transmission in a time
slot to be of unit cost.
A second distinguishing factor is that, as any transmis-
sion from a node can only be received by its immediate
one hop neighbors, a cooperator only contributes to the
game centered on itself. In the traditional definition of
PGG, a node takes part in games centered on all nodes
in its neighborhood and subsequently receives benefits
contributed by cooperators in each of the games. Such
a model is not suitable for multi-hop wireless network
since contributions from nodes more than one hop away
cannot be immediately realized by a node. Moreover, in
any time slot, a node only makes a single contribution.
In our game formulation, the benefits received by a
node i consist only of the contributions made by each
cooperating neighbor j for the game centered on itself.
We express the payoff received by a node x at any time
slot in terms of the traditional definition of PGG as,
pix = r
∑
y∈(Nx∪x)
∑
z∈(Ny∪y)
c
ky + 1
qy −
∑
y∈(Nx∪x)
c
kx + 1
qx
(2)
Here, the inner summation of first term and the summa-
tion of the second term correspond to the games centered
on all the neighbors of a node. The distinction from the
traditional definition of PGG is made by the variable qi
which takes the value 1 only if i is a cooperator for a
game centered on itself, and 0 otherwise.
Note that the benefits are not divided by the neigh-
borhood size due to the fact that only a single game
is played. Here, we make the observation that, as a
single transmission is sufficient for sharing information
with all nodes within a neighborhood, synergistic effects
exist implicitly in a wireless network. The sum of the
benefits received by all nodes in a neighborhood is
always likely to exceed that of the total cost incurred.
Thus, the synergy factor r in the above formulation
represents the additional benefits that can be realized
depending on network conditions. In this context, we
envision r as representing benefits achievable to a node
in addition to the number of received packets. Thus, r
may be used to quantify other aspects of network flow
such as traffic priority in terms of either the importance
of the information content or prioritization with regard
to network costs.
3.2 Evolution of Node Cooperation Behavior
We obtain simulation results to identify the impact of the
synergy factor and node mobility on the level of coopera-
tion. Fig. 2 shows the expected fraction of cooperators in
the steady state. The results are presented for increasing
values of the synergy factor r normalized by the average
neighborhood size in the network (〈k〉+ 1).
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Fig. 2. Impact of node velocity and synergy factor on the
fraction of cooperators in the steady state.
As with most existing studies on public goods games,
cooperation is seen to dominate for high values of the
synergy factor. This results form a high benefit to cost
ratio, due to which the cost incurred by cooperators
becomes negligible to the overall payoff received. We
note that cooperation can be sustained when the nor-
malized synergy factor η ≥ 0.6 for a static network.
This is similar to existing results on PGGs with diver-
sified contributions from cooperators. However, in PGG
formulation adapted to wireless networks above, two
opposing factors are present. As nodes only play a single
game in their neighborhood, this acts as a mitigating
factor from the point of view of enhancing cooperation as
nodes do not accumulate benefits from games centered
on other nodes in their neighborhood. This mitigating
factor, though, is countered by the implicit synergistic
effects existing in a wireless network, which act to
increase the benefits available to a node.
Increase in node velocity shifts the domination of
cooperative behavior to higher values of synergy factor.
This results from the fact that, for low to moderately high
values of synergy, node cooperation behavior is more
likely to survive in neighborhoods that have a higher
fraction of cooperators. For increasing node velocities,
neighborhood structures change frequently leading to
breakdown of clusters of cooperators. This results in a
higher likelihood of defection emerging as the dominat-
ing strategy. This effect vanishes at higher values of the
synergy factor since the cost component of the payoff
becomes negligible compared to the benefit received by
a node. As a result, cooperators are less likely to switch
to defection upon comparing payoffs with neighborhood
defectors. The result in figure 2 show a sharp shift
from a network state where almost all the nodes have
a tendency to defect to a state where almost all of
them cooperate. This is suggesting that the response
of the model has a tipping point, when it is passed it
indicate that the network will induce propel a change
in behavior into the network. This is also suggesting
6that once the change in behavior is triggered the system
become resilient to local change in the network structure
and local behavior shift. As consequence the evolution
the of cooperation in the model is only being lightly
affected by the velocity of node and the rate of change
in the network topology.
4 PUBLIC GOODS GAMES FOR INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION IN MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NET-
WORKS
Using the basic framework of public goods games de-
fined in the previous section, we now formulate a PGG
to model information dissemination. Efficient delivery of
data packets in a multi-hop network depends critically
on the set of intermediate nodes which are willing to act
as forwarding nodes. In dynamically changing networks
such as vehicular networks, this is compounded by the
changes in network topology. Our objective is to study
the conditions which allow for packet delivery perfor-
mance to adapt to the level of cooperation. We consider
a basic information dissemination problem first, based
on which we formulate the game structure and present
analytical and simulation based insights on evolution
of node cooperation behavior. In the next section, we
use this formulation to study how node cooperation and
information dissemination proceed in tandem in a more
realistic setup.
4.1 System Model
4.1.1 Problem Definition
The problem setup we consider is that of a network in
which M packets are to be disseminated. The packets
are generated by individual source nodes, all of whom
are cooperators initially. All nodes in the network are
interested in receiving all of these M packets. However,
since a node is only interested in receiving, it may not
choose to forward them to other nodes, thereby adopting
a free-riding behavior. As successful dissemination of
the packets relies on the number of nodes willing to
forward, a tradeoff exists between node behavior and
packet delivery performance.
4.1.2 Packet Transmission Algorithm
The packet transmission algorithm proceeds as follows.
Nodes buffer all packets they receive. Upon deciding to
act as a cooperator, a node randomly chooses from the
set of packets it has not yet transmitted and schedules
it for transmission. If there are no new packets to be
transmitted, any one of the packets is retransmitted.
Allowing retransmission of packets is useful for dynamic
scenarios such as in the case of mobility.
4.1.3 Mobility Model
We first use a model in which all nodes move with a
constant velocity v in randomly chosen directions. Thus,
at any time t, the coordinates of a node i is given relative
to its position at time (t− 1) as,
xi(t) = xi(t− 1) + v cos θi
yi(t) = yi(t− 1) + v sin θi
where the angle of movement θi is randomly chosen in
each time slot.
4.2 Formulation
While the above discussion outlines a framework for
formulation of public goods games in wireless networks,
we now look at individual aspects of the game formu-
lation pertaining specifically to the problem of network
wide dissemination of M packets. We elaborate further
on specific aspects of the game formulation.
As outlined earlier, the benefits obtained by nodes in a
PGG map to the number of packets received in the case
of information dissemination. The game dynamics are
determined by the payoffs received by a node in each
time slot and the resulting strategy updates. Here, the
behavior of information exchange in wireless networks
differs somewhat from how benefits are obtained in a
PGG and payoffs realized. The difference results from
the fact that while the payoffs based on neighborhood
contributions are instantly realized in a PGG, the same is
not true with packet transmissions in wireless networks
due to node contention behavior. A packet transmitted
by a node can only be received correctly by its neighbors
if no other nodes are transmitting simultaneously within
the same neighborhood, as doing so would result in
collisions. Thus, actual transmission of a packet is likely
to take place later than the time when a node decides
to enqueue a packet for transmission by acting as a
cooperator. This leads to a dilemma with regard to how
the benefits were realized. For instance, consider a node
A that chooses to act as a cooperator and enqueue a
packet at a time t, which eventually gets transmitted at
time t + τ . In this intervening time period τ , however,
it is quite likely that the A decides to switch its strategy
based on neighborhood observations of payoffs. Thus,
when the packet transmission actually takes place, A’s
strategy is actually that of a defector or a free-rider. This
could give rise to inconsistencies in the game dynamics
as neighbors of A may decide on their strategies based
on observation of A as a defector, which is a false notion
since the packet transmission actually took place because
of A’s behavior as a cooperator. Further, there is the
additional question of whether, as with the traditional
definition of PGGs, payoffs should be updated during
the time period (t, t+ τ).
We take the above mentioned factors into considera-
tion for formulating the PGG. One way of characterizing
such a scenario would be to consider the expected
delay between a node’s decision to cooperate and actual
transmission of the packet. Alternatively, as with the
variants of PGG described earlier in 2, a node can
be expected to make contributions in each time slot it
7is a cooperator, with the contribution obtained as the
probability of transmitting in each slot. The transmission
probability can be obtained in terms of the number of
contending nodes, which, in a saturated scenario, is the
entire node neighborhood, and thus correlates directly to
the contributions from cooperators in the second variant
of PGG. Considering fair random scheduling of nodes,
the cost incurred by a cooperator i in a single time slot
can be given as,
ηi =
c
ki + 1
(3)
where ki is the degree of node i. As i has equal chances
of transmitting in each of the τi = (ki + 1) time slots,
the total contribution made by a node is proportional
to how long it stays a cooperator. Thus, if it stays
a cooperator throughout the τi slots, the contribution
equals 1. Therefore, the total benefit received by a node
in a single time slot is the aggregation of contributions
from all cooperators in its neighborhood, and can be
expressed as,
bi =
r
ki + 1
∑
j∈Ni∪i
c
kj + 1
sj
where Ni denotes the set of neighbors of i and sj = 1 if
j is cooperator and 0 otherwise. A normalization factor
r
ki+1
is introduced to take into account the impact of
contention of the neighborhood of i, in addition to the
contention experienced by each node j. Subsequently,
the payoff received by a node i depends on whether it
is a cooperator or a defector,
piDi = bi
piCi = bi − ηi (4)
An important difference of the above formulation with
the traditional definition of PGG is that the payoff of a
node is only the result of the game centered on itself.
Such a design is due to the fact that nodes only receive
packets transmitted in their immediate neighborhood.
Next, we make the observation that, while the above
formulation correlates directly with node contributions
in a saturated scenario, the same is unlikely to be true for
the packet dissemination problem under investigation
since the set of contending nodes only includes coop-
erators. Thus, equation (3) can be rewritten as,
ηi =
c
nCi + 1
(5)
where nCi denotes the number of cooperators in the
neighborhood of i. As outlined earlier, the benefits in
PGG correspond to the reception of packets. In a PGG
centered at node i, the total benefit received is equal to
the total of the contributions made by each cooperator
multiplied by a factor r. In the case of the information
dissemination, however, a packet received by a node
is only meaningful if it has not been received earlier.
Thus, the only cooperators in a node’s neighborhood that
matter are those that have at least one new packet to
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Fig. 3. Figure showing direction of flow of benefits from
cooperators depending on the reception status of nodes
in a graph. Darkly shaded lines with arrows indicate edges
with flow of benefits. Lightly shaded lines indicate edges
with no flow of benefits. Lightly shaded dashed lines show
edges among defectors.
transmit. Based on this, we rewrite the benefit received
by a node i as follows
bi =
r
nCi + 1
∑
j∈Ni∪i
c
nCj + 1
tj (6)
where tj = 1 if j is a cooperator and has at least one
packet to transmit which has not yet been received by i
and 0 otherwise. The neighborhood of i is denoted byNi.
Subsequently, the payoffs are expressed as in equation
(4).
The above game formulation allows us to map the
game behavior directly to that of information dissemi-
nation. The number of packets received by a node, thus,
correlate to the total benefits accumulated over time by
a node.
The payoffs defined in equation (4) refer to the in-
stantaneous payoffs corresponding to the reception per-
formance in a single time slot. The instantaneous payoff
values are used for strategy update by nodes.
4.3 Conditions for Node Strategy Evolution
To gain an understanding of how node behavior evolves,
we obtain conditions under which the game formulation
in section 4.2 can lead to growth of cooperation in a net-
work. To do so, we look at the neighborhood conditions
that induce a node to change its behavior from that of a
defector to a cooperator.
4.3.1 Conditions for Inducing Cooperation in Static Net-
work
Consider a node i that acts as a defector at time t.
The behavior of i at time (t + 1) is determined by the
difference in payoffs of itself and its neighbors. Let ki be
the degree of i, xi the fraction of neighbors which are
cooperators and ui the fraction of cooperators that are
useful to i. As defined earlier, ui is determined by the
8set of packets already received by i at time t. The payoff
of i at time t can, thus, be written as,
piDi =
1
(xiki + 1)
uixiki
(x(t)〈k〉+ 1) (7)
where x(t) is the fraction of cooperators at time t in the
network and 〈k〉 is the average node degree. Transition
of i’s strategy to that of a cooperator at time (t + 1) is
proportional to the difference in payoff piCj of a cooper-
ating neighbor j with piDi . As with i, the payoff of j is
determined by the set of cooperators in its neighborhood
which have packets to transmit not yet received by j, and
can be given as,
piCj =
1
(xjkj + 1)
ujxjkj
(x(t)〈k〉+ 1) −
1
(xjkj + 1)
(8)
The probability that i becomes a cooperator is propor-
tional to the payoff difference, which can be expressed
as,
pi(D → C) ∝ 1
(x(t)〈k〉+ 1)
(
ujxjkj
(xjkj + 1)
− uixiki
(xiki + 1)
)
− 1
(xjkj + 1)
(9)
The above discussion shows that j is more likely to
induce cooperative behavior if it is likely to receive new
packets from cooperators in its own neighborhood. Co-
operative behavior is, thus, likely to grow from regions
of high concentration of cooperators coupled with high
diversity of source packets. Further, a high value of the
synergy factor r mitigates the role of the cost incurred
by a cooperating node.
While the above discussion outlines the conditions
that determine whether node i changes its strategy, the
probability qji(t) that a neighbor j contributes to i’s
payoff at time t depends on the set of packets already
received by each node. Let mi and mj denote the number
of packets already received by i and j respectively
at time t. The probability qji(t) is determined by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1: The probability that a node j contributes to
the benefits received by a neighbor i is given as
qji(t) =
{
x(t), if mj > mi
x(t)
[
1−
(
cj(kj−1)
kj
)mj]
, otherwise.
(10)
where cj is the clustering coefficient of j, ki and kj are
the node degrees of i and j respectively.
Proof:
(a) The first part of the result is obtained trivially as the
condition mj > mi implies that j has more packets
than i and the probability that it contributes to i’s
payoff is that it is a cooperator.
(b) When mj ≤ mi, qji(t) is the probability that j
receives at least one packet not received by i in the
time period [0, t]. To understand this, we make ob-
servations about how packet dissemination proceeds
in a static network. As the neighborhood of a node
does not change with time, any broadcasted packet
can only be received by a node if it is forwarded by
any one of its neighbors. Two neighboring nodes i
and j can, therefore, receive the same packet if it
is broadcasted by a node which is a neighbor to
both. Alternatively, j can receive a packet from a
node which is not a neighbor to i and therefore, i
does not receive it. 1 Thus, the probability that both
i and j receive the same packet from a node b is the
probability that b is a neighbor to both, which can
be given in terms of the clustering coefficient as
pcommonij = cj
(kj − 1)
kj
.
Thus, the probability that all packets received by j
are also received by i is (pcommonij )
mj . The probability
that j contributes to i’s payoff is that it has received
at least one packet which has not yet been received
by i and thus, equation (10) follows.
To further understand the implication of Lemma 1
on node cooperation behavior, we make the observation
that node interactions in this context are comprised of
two aspects, namely, (a) the influence a node has on
the payoff of its neighbors, (b) the influence of a node
on the changes in strategy of its neighbors. Lemma
1 directly shows how observation (a) is impacted by
the neighborhood structure of a node, measured as the
clustering coefficient. However, a further inference can
be drawn from Lemma 1 in relation to observation (b).
A high clustering coefficient cj implies that j shares a
greater part of its payoff with its neighbors, implying
low difference in payoff values. Thus, the probability
pi(D → C) in equation (9), for a defecting neighbor i
of j, to switch to a cooperating behavior by comparing
its payoff to j redcues with increasing cj . An extreme
case, therefore, is when Nj ⊂ Ni, Ni and Nj being the
set of neighbors of i and j, in which case j can never
influence i.
4.3.2 Conditions for Cooperation Growth with Mobility
In a network with mobile nodes, node cooperation be-
havior is impacted due to the constant churning of node
neighborhoods. As discussed earlier in section 4.3.1, the
evolution of node cooperation behavior in a network
is determined by how the node interactions impact (a)
instantaneous payoffs, (b) strategy updates.
In section 4.3.1, we noted how the clustering coeffi-
cient of a node determines node behavior in its neigh-
borhood. In a mobile scenario, however, the cluster-
ing coefficient cannot be directly correlated as it keeps
changing due to constant changes in the neighborhood
1. There is a third possibility here, which is that i receives the same
packet from another neighbor a which is not a neighbor of j. However,
this implies that the packet reached both j and a without reaching i.
The probability of this scenario is quite low [35, Fig. 1] and hence we
do not include it as part of this discussion.
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Fig. 4. Probability of meeting a new neighbor after making
a jump.
of a node. Since the payoff of a node is determined by the
number of useful cooperators in its vicinity, it can receive
higher payoffs if it meets cooperators with new packets.
Existing research has shown [36], [37] that mobility can
help improve packet delivery performance by reducing
the number of hops required. For the problem under
consideration too, mobility can impact node cooperation
behavior due to changes in the neighborhood structure
of nodes. Meeting a higher number of new nodes in each
time step, which are likely to have new packets not yet
received by a node, is likely to result in higher payoffs
compared to maintaining the same set of neighbors. We
analyze how mobility impacts the set of neighbors of a
node in each time step.
For the mobility model used above, the jump length
for a node i at any time step t is a constant distance
v. The set of neighbors of i as a result of this jump at
time (t + 1) is determined by the jumps made by other
nodes in the network, also of length v. The payoff of i at
(t+1) increases if a greater fraction of its neighborhood
consists of nodes which were not neighbors at t.
The probability that any neighbor j of i at time t is also
a neighbor at (t+1) is the probability that i and j are lo-
cated close enough to communicate with each other, i.e.
they are located within each other’s transmission range
rad. Considering N nodes distributed uniformly over a
circular region of radius R, the probability that a node
i meets an existing neighbor, pnbrold , and the probability
that it meets a new node, pnbrnew are respectively obtained
as,
pnbrold =
∫ rad
0
∫ 2pi
0
cos−1( v
2+rad2+d2
2vd
)
pi
1
2pi
dθ
 2x
rad2
dx
pnbrnew =
∫ R
rad
∫ 2pi
0
cos−1( v
2+rad2+d2
2vd
)
pi
1
2pi
dθ
 2x
(R2 − rad2)dx
(11)
where d =
√
v2 + x2 − 2xv cos θ. Subsequently, the
probabilities that, among the set of neighbors of i at
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Fig. 5. Impact of synergy and velocity on node coopera-
tion.
(t+ 1), a randomly chosen node is an old neighbor or a
new one can be obtained respectively as,
fold =
pnbrold rad
2
pnbrold rad
2 + pnbrnew(R
2 − rad2)
fnew =
pnbrnew(R
2 − rad2)
pnbrold rad
2 + pnbrnew(R
2 − rad2) (12)
A higher fraction of new neighbors, fnew > fold, implies
a higher number of useful cooperators in the neigh-
borhood of a node resulting in a higher payoff. Any
such node, thus, is more likely to influence strategies
in its neighborhood. The variation of fnew and fold with
increase in velocity is shown in Fig. 4. As can be seen, a
higher node velocity increases the likelihood of meeting
new nodes, which in turn can lead to higher payoffs as
discussed earlier.
4.4 Simulation
We use simulation results to understand the impact
of node cooperation behavior on the information dis-
semination performance. We first run simulations on a
uniformly distributed spatial network of 300 nodes and
observe the evolution of node behavior and algorithm
performance over time averaged over 50 simulation
runs.
Each simulation run starts by randomly choosing a
set of nodes as source nodes, each of which generates
a single packet to be broadcasted to all nodes in the
network. Initially, only the source nodes are cooperators.
Subsequently, at each time instant, nodes determine their
strategies based on payoffs obtained as per the game
formulation in 4.2. Each time slot is assumed to consist of
a single packet transmission. Nodes attempt to forward
buffered packets only when they choose cooperation as
a strategy. The payoffs are calculated as described in
eq. 4. The simulation is run till either all nodes use the
same strategy or the information dissemination process
is completed, i.e. all packets have been received by all
nodes.
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Fig. 5 shows how node cooperation in the steady state
is determined by values of r and v. Compared to the
basic PGG framework formulated in section 3, mobil-
ity is seen to enhance node cooperation significantly.
This results from the fact that, in the PGG formulation
adapted for information dissemination, node payoff is
a function of the number of useful cooperators and not
just the number of cooperators. As mobility speeds up
the information dissemination process, nodes are more
likely to encounter cooperators holding new packets and
are thus ’useful’, leading to higher payoffs and more
chances of cooperative behavior.
5 NODE COOPERATION BEHAVIOR FOR CON-
TENT DOWNLOADING IN VEHICULAR NET-
WORKS
We now study node cooperation behavior in the context
of content downloading services in a vehicular network.
Content downloading services are likely to grow in
popularity in future vehicular networks. Applications
are likely to range from traffic related information such
as safety and route information to user specific media
content. Similar to existing studies [37]–[39], we consider
a scenario in which all vehicular nodes are interested in
downloading content from a single service provider. The
content dissemination is done by the service provider by
distributing them to a set of seeder nodes. The seeder
nodes then broadcast the packets to their immediate
neighbors, which in turn choose to relay them to other
nodes depending on their cooperation strategy. The node
strategy evolution follows the same PGG formulation in
section 4.2.
5.1 Network Model
We consider a network of N mobile nodes, all of whom
are interested in receiving a set of M packets from a
content service provider. The nature of the content itself
could depend on the type of vehicular application. For
instance, a large media file could be composed of M
chunks. Alternatively, each packet could correspond to
individual pieces of information in which all nodes are
interested. We consider a scenario in which the service
provider distributes all of these packets to a set of seeder
nodes distributed randomly in the network. At each time
slot, a seeder transmits a randomly chosen packet from
the set of M packets to its immediate neighbors. Dis-
semination to the rest of the network is determined by
the relaying behavior of non-seeder nodes and therefore,
depends on the evolution of node cooperation in the
network. As in section 4, the strategy adopted by a node
at each time slot depends on the payoff obtained by
its immediate neighbors, determined by the number of
useful cooperators in the neighborhood.
A similar setup was considered in [40], where a small
subset of nodes in the network receive content directly
from the service provider. Packet forwarding is limited
100 101 102
Distance [m]
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P
(X
 >
 x
)
100 101 102
Pause Time [mins]
Fig. 7. Levy walk model used in our simulations, we plot
an example with the velocity of node set to 5m/s, (cf. Table
1 for more information about the other parameters)
to a set of helper nodes, which includes nodes receiv-
ing content directly from the service provider, while
the rest of the nodes in the network are marked as
subscribers which only receive packets. However, the
impact of evolution of node strategies is not studied
in [40]. We focus on how information dissemination is
impacted when nodes are allowed to switch strategies
depending on the payoffs received. A key difference with
the scenario in section 4 is the presence of a dedicated set
of seeder nodes which always maintain their strategy as
cooperators. Such a provision is necessary since seeder
nodes always begin with the complete set of packets.
Therefore, allowing them to change strategies using the
PGG formulation would immediately result in them
acting as defectors, thereby halting the dissemination
process. Moreover, from the perspective of practical
application, this corresponds to a scenario in which a
service provider deploys seeder nodes to improve data
delivery performance at receivers.
All nodes move according to the Levy Walk mobility
model [41], [42]. While a majority of existing research
has illustrated the accuracy of Levy Walks in predicting
human mobility, recent research has shown that the
same is also true for vehicular mobility [40], [43], [44].
Moreover the study of cities road networks in [45],
[46] show that the typical distance `1 between nodes
intersection scale as P (`1) ∼ `−γ1 suggesting that Levy
Walk will be a meaningful approximation (given the
existence a cutoff) of the jump length distribution of cars
from intersection to intersection in a roadmap. Hence,
adopting such a model presents a realistic setup for
studying node cooperation behavior in the presence of
mobility (cf. Fig. 7).
5.2 Simulation Results
Our simulation setup consists of a network of 400 nodes,
a subset of which are seeders. We obtain results for
different values of the number of seeders in the net-
work. We run simulations on a more realistic setup of
randomly distributed nodes in which the neighborhood
11
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Fig. 6. Node cooperation level in the steady state, (a) for the case of a networks with 30 seeders, (b) subset of the
simulations with velocity 0 m/s and 10 ms/s for the case of 30 seeders, (c) full set of simulation for the case of a
networks with 60 seeders,(d) subset of the simulations with velocity 0 m/s and 10 ms/s for the case of 60 seeders.
The initial fraction of cooperator in Fig (b) and (d) account from the fact that the seeders are alway cooperator
of each node is determined by its transmission range. We
used the quasi unit disk model where Pc the probability
to connect to neighbor node is given relative to their
distance x (cf. eq. 13),
Pc(x) =

1 iff x < Rinner
1− ( Router−x
Router−Rinner )
ζ iff Router ≥ x ≥ Rinner
0 iff x > Router
(13)
In order to allow for errors in calculation of payoffs in
a realistic scenario, we include a gaussian noise param-
eter which introduces a certain degree of randomness,
piDi = bi +N (0, σ)
piCi = bi + ηi +N (0, σ) (14)
The parameter values used in the simulation are listed
in Table 1.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of the number of seeders on
the node cooperation level in the steady state. Increas-
ing the number of seeders results in a higher level of
cooperation in the network. This is an expected result
as more seeders implies faster dissemination of packets
in the network, thereby leading to higher likelihood of
finding ’useful’ nodes. Thus, cooperating nodes have a
higher probability of influencing neighborhood behavior.
A surprising observation, however, is that, in the η − v
region in which cooperation dominates, the actual level
of cooperation is higher when the number of seeders is
lower. This results due to the fact that, while increasing
the number of seeders results in a higher likelihood of
cooperative behavior, this is accompanied by faster dis-
semination of information. Thus, nodes quickly receive
the entire set of packets they are interested in. A small
fraction of nodes are, thus, likely to stay non-cooperative.
However the cooperation level remain only mildly im-
pacted by the mobility of users (in the reasonable range
simulated in this simulation).
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Fig. 8. The figures (a) and (b) show the evolution of distribution of packets received by nodes across different velocity
and synergy factor (r). Both figures showed that both factors greatly improve the spreading efficiency of the packets
across the networks, from weak diffusion of packets in fig. (a).A to almost full diffusion in fig. (a).T (the same is true
for fig (b).A and (b).S respectively). In fig (a) the diffusion append for lower synergy factor than in fig (b) due to the fact
there are twice the number of seeders. The buffer size for fig. (a) is 50 packets and for fig. (b) 100 packets. In fig (a) in
the case of 60 seeders for r > 2 we achieved full diffusion in almost all the cases
In Fig. 8 we show the joint effect cooperation level
and the dissemination process through the cumulative
distribution of the number of packets received by nodes
across the network. The ECDF shifts towards the right
for higher values of r and v signifying improved dis-
semination of packets as nodes are more likely to get
all packets. We show here that the mobility and the
cooperation level (r stands for the synergy factor) have
both a great impact on the speed of dissemination pro-
cess through the networks. The same phenomenon is
observed in Fig. 9, and Fig. 10, in both cases we shown
how the set of packets pending to be delivered evolve as
function of the velocity and the cooperation level. In Fig
9 we show that the number of packet remaining to be
delivered decrease as function of both R (the cooperation
level), and the number of seeders. In Fig 10 in the case
of 30 seeders, we can observe a sharp decrease of the
number of packets pending to be delivered for different
r values, indeed in 10(a) and 10(b) the number of packets
stay stable over different velocities but in 10 (c) and
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TABLE 1
Simulations Parameters
Parameters Value Parameters Value
Simulations Parameters Levy-walk Parameters
Size of simulation area 1000.0 m2 α 0.9
Number of node 400 β 0.9
Simulation length 300.0 s velocity [0 .. 15.0] m/s
Number of seeder [30, 60] Quasi-unit-disk Parameters
Buffer size [50, 100] ζ 0.3
PGG Parameters Rinner 40.0 m
Initial cooperator ratio 0.5 Router 75.0 m
Noise variance (σ) 0.1
r = 1.0 r = 2.0
102
103
104
105
106
Seeder =30, Velocity = 5
r = 1.0 r = 2.0
Seeder =60, Velocity = 5
Fig. 9. Number of packets remaining to be delivered for
different number of seeder.
10 (d) once a given value a the threshold value of r is
crossed the number of packet drops significantly and the
information dissemination took place for almost all the
nodes in the network.
5.2.1 Simulation Code
The code used in this paper is available at [47]
5.3 Comparison with Classical Game Theory based
Approaches
The motivation for the choice of an evolutionary game
theory based approach was discussed earlier in section
1. To particularly highlight the benefits of our proposed
model in the context of content downloading in vehic-
ular networks, we draw comparison with approaches
in existing literature that use classical game theory in
similar deployments. In [17], a node computes the utility
of each data file by taking into consideration the vehicle
movement details such as the route and velocity and also
characteristics of the data such as priority, size, age and
geographical region. Two vehicles that encounter each
other determine the set of packets to exchange using an
algorithm based on Nash Bargaining. The same authors
propose a similar approach in [18] with the objective of
achieving fairness in data dissemination. Shrestha et al.
v = 1 v = 5 v = 10 v = 15
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Seeder = 30, r = 1
(a)
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100
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102
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Seeder = 30, r = 4
(d)
Fig. 10. Number of packets remaining to be delivered for
various parameters v and r
proposed a utility function based on packet priorities
in [19] and subsequently evaluated the performance of
different bargaining algorithms.
A primary distinguishing feature of our proposed
model with the above approaches is the localized nature
of the information, both from the spatial and tempo-
ral perspectives. Not only is the information required
limited to the immediate neighborhood, nodes are also
assumed not to have any predetermined knowledge
such as vehicle routes, packet priorities, etc. as all such
information itself may be dynamic. Allowing myopic
node decision making allows us to study how the net-
work state determines its behavior in the succeeding
time period. We envision this study to be useful from the
point of view of planning for information dissemination
in vehicular networks. For instance, in the scenario
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considered in section 5, seeder nodes may choose the
set of packets to transmit depending on their immediate
neighborhood, so as to maximize dissemination. Further,
while the proposed model only takes into consideration
packet reception status at nodes, it can be enhanced to
accommodate other factors which can play a role in node
decision making. For instance, factors such as residual
energy may determine a node’s forwarding behavior,
which can be included in the model.
6 CONCLUSION
We introduce in this paper a framework based on
Evolutionary Game Theory to study the evolution of
node cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks. After
introducing the general feature of the EGT, we proposed
a model of node cooperation behavior that adapts Public
Goods Games to the specifics of wireless ad hoc net-
works. Further on, we described in which conditions
networks could evolve and sustain a state of near to full
cooperation among the devices. Our main contribution
in this work is aimed at demonstrating the joint effects
of the cooperation and the mobility rate on the spread
of the information in wireless multi-hop networks. To
fully take advantage of a rapid dissemination process
in a rapidly changing environment we show that we
need to exploit in tandem both the mobility and self-
propagating property of the EGT to enable control of
the node behavior. We also show how the success of
the resulting diffusion process depends on the nature
of the interactions between this two properties. Finally,
we envision that the proposed model can be enhanced
to develop a deeper understanding of cooperation in
wireless networks by incorporating other parameters
that impact node behavior such as energy consumption.
Moreover, as the proposed model is centered around
group interactions, the model can be used to study other
forms of data delivery in wireless networks such as
multi-hop unicast.
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